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UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES: THE LINK
BETWEEN JUDGE FRIENDLY’S TEXAS
GULF SULPHUR CONCURRENCE AND
RECENT SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
MISCONSTRUING RULE 10b-5
Margaret V. Sachs*
ABSTRACT
In his Texas Gulf Sulphur concurrence, Judge Henry J. Friendly coun-
seled the federal district courts concerning the numerous pending satellite
class actions that had been filed under Section 10(b) of the Securities Ex-
change Act and Rule 10b-5. In the course of so doing, he argued forcefully
that private Rule 10b-5 litigation should be curtailed. Finding his argument
convincing, the Supreme Court issued four major decisions restricting the
Rule between 1975 and 1994, while nonetheless expanding it in Basic Inc.
v. Levinson. Congress responded by blessing both aspects of the Court’s
jurisprudence – imposing its own set of restrictions in the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (the PSLRA) and the Securities Litigation
Uniform Standards Act of 1998 as well as deciding to leave Basic intact
after contemplating an override.
Emboldened by Congress’s double ratification, the Court has since re-
stricted private Rule 10b-5 litigation on three separate occasions with mon-
umental consequences. Judge Friendly would not have approved of these
restrictions, since they rest on misreadings that ought to have been dis-
cerned. In Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd., for example, the
Court extracted from Section 10(b) a “transactional test” designed to curb
the Section’s extraterritorial reach. The test assumes that Section 10(b) ex-
tends to over the counter transactions due to the unavailability of exchange
venues for the transactions in unregistered securities to which the Section
refers. But that analysis ignores the reality that exchanges could serve as
hosts for such transactions when Section 10(b) was enacted, as the face of
the original Exchange Act makes apparent.
Thereafter, in Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, the
Court imposed an “ultimate authority test” to determine who can “make” a
materially misleading misstatement or omission that violates Rule 10b-5(b)
* Robert Cotten Alston Professor of Law, University of Georgia School of Law.
A.B., Harvard University: J.D., Harvard Law School. I am grateful to Barbara Black, Rob-
ert W. Hillman, Alexander M. Meiklejohn, and Donna M. Nagy for their helpful sugges-
tions on previous drafts of this essay.
947
948 SMU LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71
and Section 10(b). The test typically attributes “ultimate authority” to a
single maker, thereby conflicting with the PSLRA’s proportionate liability
provision. That provision assumes that many cases will involve multiple
violators by deeming each violator liable only for the percentage of damage
that the jury found it to have caused.
Finally, in California Public Employees’ Retirement System v. ANZ
Securities, Inc., the Court denied securities class action plaintiffs access to
an equitable tolling doctrine available to their antitrust counterparts. That
denial assumed that when drafting the antitrust limitation provision, Con-
gress knew that a “statute of repose” bars equitable tolling but that a “stat-
ute of limitation” does not. That assumption is flawed. Although Congress
enacted the antitrust limitation provision in 1955, it did not become aware
of the statute of repose/statute of limitation distinction until 1982, according
to a Supreme Court decision issued three years prior to ANZ.
Any prospect of a course correction may turn on whether securities law
academics become more vigilant overseers of the Court’s Rule 10b-5 re-
strictions. There is also the possibility that Justice Sonia Sotomayor, the
only current Justice with experience on securities regulation’s “Mother
Court,” will put that experience to use by guiding her fellow Justices
through the securities law thicket.
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TO commemorate the fiftieth anniversary of SEC v. Texas GulfSulphur Co.,1 I have chosen to focus on Judge Henry J. Friendly’sconcurrence.2 One of the most celebrated jurists of the twentieth
1. 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc).
2. Id. at 864–68 (Friendly, J., concurring).
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century,3 Judge Friendly achieved special renown in the area of securities
law.4 Thirteen securities opinions of the U.S. Supreme Court mention
him by name.5
In his concurrence, Judge Friendly warned of the dangers of unbridled
private litigation under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 (the Exchange Act)6 and Rule 10b-5,7 thereby setting in motion a
remarkable chain of events. His warning led the Supreme Court to up-
hold numerous Rule 10b-5 restrictions, an approach that Congress emu-
lated in the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (the
PSLRA)8 and the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998
(the SLUSA).9 Congress’s emulation, coupled with its failure to override
the expansion of Rule 10b-5 authorized by Basic Inc. v. Levinson, em-
3. See, e.g., DAVID M. DORSEN, HENRY FRIENDLY, GREATEST JUDGE OF HIS ERA 1
(2012).
4. See Margaret V. Sachs, Judge Friendly and the Law of Securities Regulation: The
Creation of a Judicial Reputation, 50 SMU L. REV. 777 (1997).
5. See, e.g., Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 259 n.4 (2010); Stoner-
idge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Sci.–Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 177–78 (2008); Tellabs, Inc. v.
Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 320 (2007); Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224,
238 (1988); Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 701 (1980); Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 485 n.16
(1979) (citing Judge Friendly’s observation concerning a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure);
Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 475 n.27 (1978); Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus.,
Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 42 (1977); TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976);
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 197, 211, 214 (1976); Blue Chips Stamps v.
Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 739 (1975); Kern Cty. Land Co. v. Occidental Petroleum
Corp., 411 U.S. 582, 604 n.31 (1973); Caplin v. Marine Midland Grace Tr. Co., 406 U.S. 416,
430 (1972). See also Morrison, 561 U.S. at 275, 281, 282 (Stevens, J., concurring); Reves v.
Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 74 (1990) (Stevens, J., concurring); Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 373, 387 n.86, 390 (1982) (pertaining to the
Commodities Exchange Act); Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co., 426 U.S. 148, 163 n.10,
166 (1966) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
6. Exchange Act § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012). Section 10 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any
facility of any national securities exchange—. . . . (b) To use or employ, in
connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered on a national
securities exchange or any security not so registered, any manipulative or
deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regula-
tions as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the
public interest or for the protection of investors.
7. Rule 10b-5, promulgated by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in
1942, provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any
facility of any national securities exchange, (a) To employ any device,
scheme, or artifice to defraud, (b) To make any untrue statement of a mate-
rial fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the
statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were
made, not misleading, or (c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of busi-
ness which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2017).
8. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
9. Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat.
3227 (codified in scattered subsections of 15 U.S.C. §§ 77, 78, 80).
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boldened the Court in its quest to curtail the Rule. Indeed, three times so
far in the twenty-first century, it has imposed significant restrictions
anchored in misinterpretations of the statutory text—misinterpretations
it almost certainly would have discovered had it fully examined the rele-
vant materials.
This essay proceeds in five parts. After describing Judge Friendly’s
warning (Part I), the Supreme Court’s twentieth-century Rule 10b-5 re-
strictions (Part II), and the additional restrictions supplied at century’s
end by the PLSRA and the SLUSA (Part III), Part IV shifts the focus to
the twenty-first century and the misreadings underlying the restrictions
imposed in Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd.,10 Janus Capital
Group, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders,11 and California Employees’ Re-
tirement System v. ANZ Securities, Inc.12 Part V considers why these mis-
readings have been ignored by securities-law academics and highlights
dimensions of these decisions that warrant particular attention.
I. JUDGE FRIENDLY’S WARNING
In its action in Texas Gulf Sulphur, the SEC sought to enjoin a corpo-
ration and several individuals for disseminating a misleading press release
while engaging in insider trading in violation of Section 10(b) and Rule
10b-5(b).13 The press release had also given rise to private Rule 10b-5
actions against the same defendants. As the federal district judge noted,
approximately forty-nine such actions, most of them of the class-action
variety, were pending in the Southern District of New York when the trial
of the SEC action concluded in 1966.14 The Second Circuit had upheld
the existence of an implied private Rule 10b-5 action more than a decade
earlier,15 although the Supreme Court had not yet done so.16
Writing for the majority of the Second Circuit en banc in 1968, Judge
Sterry R. Waterman held that to obtain an injunction, the SEC need only
show that the defendants acted negligently.17 He did not address whether
the same would hold true for a private plaintiff seeking damages.18
In his concurrence, Judge Friendly parted company with the majority
over its deferral of the scienter question.19 In his view, the pendency of
the district court cases, coupled with the importance attached to the
Texas Gulf Sulphur litigation by the legal community, obliged the circuit
10. 561 U.S. 247 (2010).
11. 564 U.S. 135 (2011).
12. 137 S. Ct. 2042 (2017).
13. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 258 F. Supp. 262 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), aff’d in part,
rev’d in part, 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc).
14. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 258 F. Supp. at 267 n.1.
15. See Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 783, 787 & n.4 (2d Cir. 1951).
16. The Supreme Court recognized the action in Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers
Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971).
17. See Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d at 863.
18. Id.
19. See id. at 866–67 (Friendly, J., concurring).
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court to “give the district courts . . . as much guidance as we can.”20
Seeking to provide that guidance, he described the case for requiring
scienter as being not altogether free from doubt, at least from the stand-
point of the Rule. He blamed the uncertainty on Rule 10b-5’s drafters,
who “turned their backs” on the intentionality implicit in Section 10(b)21
by modeling the Rule on Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933 (the
Securities Act),22 the second subsection of which does not require scien-
ter.23 Thus, at least on its face, Section 17(a)(2)’s progeny, Rule 10b-5(b),
does not require scienter either, unless, as he thought likely, Section
10(b)’s countervailing mandate were to carry the day.24
This textual uncertainty notwithstanding, he regarded the case for sci-
enter as indisputable once policy considerations were taken into account.
In his view, the failure to cabin Rule 10b-5 damages actions with a scien-
ter requirement would lead to vexatious litigation, the costs of which
would ultimately be borne by shareholders themselves:
If the only choices open to a corporation are either to remain silent
and let false rumors do their work, or to make a communication, not
legally required, at the risk that a slip of the pen or failure properly
to amass or weigh the facts—all judged in the bright gleam of hind-
sight—will lead to large judgments, payable in the last analysis by
innocent investors, for the benefit of speculators and their lawyers,
most corporations would opt for the former.25
II. JUDGE FRIENDLY’S WARNING RESONATES WITH THE
SUPREME COURT
Within four years of Texas Gulf Sulphur, private Rule 10b-5 litigation
made its Supreme Court debut. The debut came during the 1972 term,
when the activism that had begun in the 1960s still held sway.26 Not sur-
prisingly, that activism engulfed Rule 10b-5 as well. Thus, in Superinten-
dent of Insurance v. Bankers Life & Casualty Company, the Court
recognized the existence of an implied private action under the Rule
without providing a rationale.27 Moreover, later in the term in Affiliated
Ute Citizens v. United States, it granted a presumption of reliance in “pure
omission” cases, but offered no justification for so doing.28
20. Id. at 866.
21. Id. at 867.
22. Securities Act § 17(a), 15 U.S.C. §77q(a) (2012).
23. See Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d at 867 (Friendly, J., concurring).
24. See id. at 868 (noting that “I am not convinced that imposition of liability for dam-
ages under Rule 10b-5(2), absent a scienter requirement . . . would not go beyond the
authority vested in the Commission by § 10(b)”) (emphasis added).
25. Id. at 867.
26. See Archibald Cox, The Role of the Supreme Court: Judicial Activism or Self-Re-
straint?, 47 MD. L. REV. 118, 127–29 (1987).
27. See 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971).
28. See 406 U.S. 128, 153–54 (1972). While Affiliated Ute does not refer to a presump-
tion as such, the decision is understood to have created one. See DONNA M. NAGY, RICH-
ARD W. PAINTER & MARGARET V. SACHS, SECURITIES LITIGATION AND ENFORCEMENT:
CASES AND MATERIALS 146 (4th ed. 2017).
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By the mid-1970s, however, activism had given way to constraint.29
Aiding and abetting this transformation with reference to securities law
was Justice Lewis F. Powell, an experienced corporate litigator who
joined the Court in 1972.30 Justice Powell had an unfavorable view of
implied private actions in general and the Rule 10b-5 private action in
particular.31
Having awakened to the perils of unconstrained Rule 10b-5 litigation,
the Court issued four decisions restricting the Rule between 1975 and
1994.32 First came Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, which re-
quires Rule 10b-5 plaintiffs to have bought or sold the security in ques-
tion in order to have standing to sue.33 Because standing is a subject
unique to private actions,34 the Court did not anchor its holding in the
text of Section 10(b).35 Instead, it focused mainly on “the danger of vexa-
tious litigation,”36 a danger which, it observed, Judge Friendly had identi-
fied in his Texas Gulf Sulphur concurrence and several other federal
appellate judges had noted thereafter.37
Next came Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, which requires Rule 10b-5
plaintiffs to establish scienter.38 Drawing on Judge Friendly’s contrast be-
tween the intentionality implicit in Section 10(b) and the lack of a scien-
ter requirement in Rule 10b-5(b),39 the Court adopted the position to
which Friendly himself had been inclined—that the statute trumps the
Rule.40
Then came Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, which held that Rule 10b-
5 requires deception, thereby rendering it inapplicable to mere breaches
of fiduciary duty.41 The Court premised its holding largely on Section
10(b)’s requirement of “deception” or “manipulation,”42 deeming the lat-
29. See Alfred E. Conard, Securities Regulation in the Burger Court, 56 U. COLO. L.
REV. 193, 193–94 (1985); Lewis D. Lowenfels, Recent Supreme Court Decisions Under the
Federal Securities Laws: The Pendulum Swings, 65 GEO. L.J. 891 (1977).
30. See A.C. Pritchard, Lewis F. Powell, Jr., and the Counterrevolution in the Federal
Securities Laws, 52 DUKE L.J. 841 (2003).
31. See, e.g., Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 730 (1979) (Powell, J.,
dissenting).
32. See Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S.
164 (1994); Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977); Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723
(1975).
33. 421 U.S. at 754–55.
34. Cf. SEC v. Nat’l Secs., Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 467 n.9 (1969) (deeming issues of stand-
ing to be inapposite to SEC actions).
35. The Court briefly referred to Section 10(b)’s requirement of a “connection with” a
purchase or sale. See Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 733–34. But it rested primarily on
policy considerations, see id. at 737, an interpretation confirmed by Merrill Lynch Pierce
Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 81 (2006).
36. Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 740.
37. See id. at 739–40.
38. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
39. See id. at 214.
40. See id.
41. 430 U.S. 462, 478–80 (1977).
42. See id. at 473.
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ter to encompass specialized forms of deceptive behavior.43 Moreover,
the Court observed, even if Rule 10b-5 standing alone could accommo-
date mere fiduciary breaches, the Rule must give way to the statute.44
The Court also offered another reason for its holding: To allow Section
10(b) to encompass mere fiduciary breaches would bring within Rule
10b-5 “a wide variety of corporate conduct traditionally subject to state
regulation,”45 thereby presenting a “danger of vexatious litigation” of the
sort envisioned by Blue Chip Stamps.46
Finally, there was Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank,
N.A., which found no authorization for aiding and abetting liability in
either Section 10(b) or in the express private actions, which were analo-
gous, in the Court’s view, to the private Rule 10b-5 action.47 The Court
also underscored the “costs” of allowing aiding and abetting liability, such
as “requir[ing] secondary actors to expend large sums even for pretrial
defense and the negotiation of settlements.”48 Elaborating in language
reminiscent of Judge Friendly, the Court observed that those sums “may
be passed on to the client companies, and in turn incurred by the com-
pany’s investors.”49
By rejecting aiding and abetting liability, the Court spurned a long-
standing lower-court consensus.50 Possibly for this reason, it tempered its
holding by depicting expansively the wide range of actors who may face
liability as primary violators.51
To be sure, the Court’s approach to private Rule 10b-5 litigation during
this period was not uniformly restrictive. The most noteworthy contrary
example was Basic Inc. v. Levinson,52 a 4–2 decision in which the three
then-most-conservative Justices did not participate.53 Writing for the ma-
jority, Justice Harry R. Blackmun upheld a presumption of reliance based
in part on the efficient capital markets hypothesis54 that has served as the
sine qua non for virtually every Rule 10b-5 class action brought since
43. See id. at 476.
44. Id. at 472–73.
45. Id. at 478.
46. Id. at 479.
47. 511 U.S. 164 (1994). By focusing on the text of Section 10(b), as well as that of the
private actions, the Court created uncertainty about whether the decision carried implica-
tions for the SEC. See generally Symposium on the Central Bank Decision: The Demise of
Aiding and Abetting?, 49 BUS. LAW. 1429 (1994). Congress intervened the following year to
restore the SEC’s right to proceed against aiders and abettors. See infra notes 65–66 and
accompanying text.
48. Cent. Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. at 189.
49. See id.
50. See id. at 169.
51. For the precise language used by the Court, see id. at 191. See infra text accompa-
nying note 104.
52. 485 U.S. 224 (1988), aff’d, Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 134 S. Ct.
2398 (2014). For another non-restrictive decision issued during this period, see Herman &
MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 387 (1983) (upholding the cumulativeness of the
private Rule 10b-5 remedy and the remedy authorized by Section 11 of the Securities Act).
53. The Justices not participating in the Basic decision were Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justices Scalia and Kennedy. See Basic, 485 U.S. at 225.
54. See id. at 246 n.24.
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then.55 While Justice Blackmun did not mention the threat of vexatious
litigation, that threat received attention from Justice Byron R. White in a
dissenting opinion joined by Justice Sandra Day O’Connor.56 After ask-
ing “who will pay the judgments won in . . . actions” fueled by the newly-
recognized presumption of reliance,57 Justice White drew directly on
Judge Friendly in lamenting that “all too often the majority’s rule will
‘lead to large judgments, payable in the last analysis by innocent inves-
tors, for the benefit of speculators and their lawyers.’”58
III. THE SUPREME COURT’S APPROACH RESONATES WITH
CONGRESS
In 1995, Congress enacted the PSLRA, a comprehensive effort to cur-
tail private securities litigation that had the enthusiastic support of the
accounting and high-tech industries.59 Three years later, Congress supple-
mented the PSLRA with the SLUSA, which prevents plaintiffs from
avoiding the PLSRA’s requirements by filing securities fraud class actions
based on state law.60
The concerns that gave rise to the PSLRA strongly resembled those
articulated by the Supreme Court in Blue Chip Stamps and by Judge
Friendly’s concurrence in Texas Gulf Sulphur.61 Indeed, the Conference
Report described the PSLRA as aimed at “abusive and meritless” securi-
ties actions that lead to “extortionate ‘settlements,’” render investors
“the ultimate losers,” and “affect[ ] the willingness of corporate managers
to disclose information to the marketplace.”62
To address these concerns, the PSLRA imposed multiple restrictions
on Rule 10b-5 and other private securities actions, including a safe harbor
for forward-looking statements, a loss-causation requirement, heightened
pleading requirements, an adjustment to the calculation of damages, a
proportionate liability system, and mandatory stays of discovery pending
resolution of motions to dismiss.63 Various other provisions were directed
at class actions specifically.64
55. See NAGY, PAINTER & SACHS, supra note 28, at 151.
56. See Basic, 485 U.S. at 250–63 (White, J., dissenting).
57. Id. at 262.
58. Id.
59. See generally John W. Avery, Securities Litigation Reform: The Long and Winding
Road to the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 51 BUS. LAW. 335 (1996); John
C. Coffee, Jr., The Future of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act: Or, Why the Fat
Lady Has Not Yet Sung, 51 BUS. LAW. 975 (1996).
60. See generally Richard W. Painter, Responding to a False Alarm: Federal Preemp-
tion of State Securities Fraud Causes of Action, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1998); Michael A.
Perino, Fraud and Federalism: Preempting Private State Securities Fraud Causes of Action,
50 STAN. L. REV. 273 (1998).
61. The Supreme Court has noted the similarity between the policies underlying Blue
Chip Stamps and those of the PSLRA. See Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith, Inc. v.
Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 81 (2006).
62. H.R. Rep. No. 104-369 (1995) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730
[hereinafter Conference Report].
63. See NAGY, PAINTER & SACHS, supra note 28, at 10.
64. See id. at 10–11.
2018] Unintended Consequences 955
Moreover, the PSLRA left intact all of the restrictions on private Rule
10b-5 litigation that the Court had previously imposed.65 The only aspect
of the Court’s jurisprudence that was overridden involved restoring to the
SEC the right to sue aiders and abettors—a right that the Commission
had arguably lost as the result of Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First
Interstate Bank, N.A.66
In addition, Congress let stand the presumption of reliance upheld by
Basic Inc. v. Levinson after contemplating its nullification during the en-
actment process.67 Perhaps Congress’s inaction reflected an unwillingness
to deal a mortal blow to private securities enforcement, which the Con-
ference Report described as “an essential tool.”68 Alternatively, or in ad-
dition, it may have reflected trust in the Court’s Rule 10b-5 stewardship.
IV. CONGRESS’S RATIFICATION EMBOLDENS THE COURT
In the twenty-first century, the Supreme Court has so far issued twelve
decisions directly implicating the scope of private Rule 10b-5 litigation.69
Some have construed provisions of the PSLRA70 or the SLUSA,71 while
others have addressed the presumption of reliance upheld by Basic Inc. v.
Levinson.72 Still others have imposed new restrictions.73 Each of the deci-
sions in this last group—by far the strangest of the lot—rests its restric-
tion on a misreading of the statutory text that the Court ought to have
recognized.
A. CURBING EXTRATERRITORIALITY—MORRISON V. NATIONAL
AUSTRALIA BANK LTD.
In Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd., the Supreme Court re-
jected the tests that had long governed Rule 10b-5’s transnational reach
and substituted a far more restrictive test in their place.74 The Court ex-
tracted the new test from the text of Section 10(b), apparently oblivious
to the fact that the test did not fit the text as its drafters would have
65. For discussion of these restrictions, see Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462
(1977); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor
Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
66. See Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank, N.A., 511 U.S. 164,
195–96 (1994) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
67. See Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Tr. Funds, 568 U.S. 455, 481–82 (2013).
68. See Conference Report, supra note 62.
69. See infra notes 70–73.
70. See Tellabs, Inc v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308 (2007); Dura Pharm.,
Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336 (2005).
71. See Cyan, Inc. v. Beaver Cty. Emps. Ret. Fund, 138 S.Ct. 1061 (2018); Chadbourne
& Parke LLP v. Troice, 571 U.S. 377 (2014); Kircher v. Putnam Funds Tr., 547 U.S. 633
(2006); Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71 (2006).
72. See Halliburton Co. v Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2398 (2014); Amgen Inc.
v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Tr. Funds, 568 U.S. 455 (2013); Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Hallibur-
ton Co., 563 U.S. 804 (2011).
73. See Calif. Publ. Emps. Ret. Sys. v. ANZ Secs., Inc., 137 S. Ct. 2042 (2017); Janus
Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 564 U.S. 135 (2011); Morrison v. Nat’l Austl.
Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247 (2010).
74. See Morrison, 561 U.S. at 269–70.
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understood it. Thereafter, in the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act (the Dodd-Frank Act), Congress brought the
former tests back to life, but only for actions filed by the SEC and the
Department of Justice (DOJ).75
Before Morrison, the lower courts resolved questions of Rule 10b-5’s
transnational reach by applying the conduct and effects tests, both devel-
oped in significant measure by Judge Friendly.76 The effects test focused
on whether the transaction led to immediate and substantial domestic ef-
fects,77 while the conduct test looked to whether domestic conduct com-
prised the bulk of the fraud.78 These tests offered relatively few bright
lines,79 but they tended to give plaintiffs wide latitude to challenge trans-
actions with significant foreign elements.
The Morrison plaintiffs were Australians who bought shares of an Aus-
tralian company (National Australia Bank or NAB) on an Australian ex-
change. Seeking to satisfy the conduct test, the plaintiffs tried
unsuccessfully to persuade the lower courts that NAB’s subsidiary had
concocted the fraud in Florida.80
The Court that adjudicated Morrison consisted of eight members.81
While all eight agreed that the dismissal of the plaintiffs’ action should be
affirmed, they otherwise parted company. Writing on behalf of himself
and four of his colleagues, Justice Antonin Scalia upheld the Court’s new
transactional test, which, he showed, the plaintiffs did not satisfy. Two
opinions concurred in the judgment. One, written by Justice Stephen
Breyer, took the position that a new test was warranted but that the
lower courts should have been tasked with developing it.82 The other,
written by Justice John Paul Stevens and joined by Justice Ruth Bader
Ginsburg, argued that the transactional test was inferior to the conduct
and effects tests for reasons of policy.83
Justice Scalia began his opinion by castigating the conduct and effects
tests for their breadth, their unpredictability, their lack of textual ground-
ing, and their failure to defer to the presumption against extraterritorial-
75. See Dodd-Frank Act, § 929P(b), Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 136 (2010) (codified
at 15 U.S.C. § 78aa). But cf. text accompanying note 133 infra (referencing argument that
the Dodd-Frank Act did not achieve this goal).
76. See Morrison, 561 U.S. at 275 n.1 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
77. See id. at 257.
78. See id.
79. See, e.g., IIT v. Cornfeld, 619 F.2d 909, 918 (2d Cir. 1980) (noting that a given
factor may be important in one case but not in another). See also Europe & Overseas
Commodity Traders, S.A. v. Banque Paribas London, 147 F.3d 118, 129 (2d Cir. 1998)
(noting that court may be entitled to hear a Rule 10b-5 because of the presence of one or
more factors that “tip[ ] the scales”).
80. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 547 F.3d 167, 176 (2d Cir. 2008), aff’d on other
grounds, 561 U.S. 274 (2010).
81. Justice Sotomayor did not participate in the consideration of the case or its deci-
sion. See Morrison, 561 U.S. at 273. Presumably, the reason was that she served on the
Second Circuit when it issued the decision under review.
82. Id. at 273–74 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
83. Id. at 274, 281–84 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
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ity.84 Upon concluding that Section 10(b) had no extraterritorial reach, he
noted that this conclusion did not end the inquiry, since some securities
transactions with foreign elements might still be domestic enough to sat-
isfy Section 10(b).85 To ascertain what would constitute a sufficient do-
mestic nexus, he sought the “focus” of Section 10(b), which makes it
illegal for anyone “[t]o use or employ, in connection with the purchase or
sale of any security registered on a national securities exchange or any se-
curity not so registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contri-
vance.”86 He divided the italicized portion into the following two prongs
to accommodate transactions on exchanges as well as those conducted
over the counter: (i) “transactions in securities listed [registered] on a
domestic [national] exchange;” and (ii) “domestic transactions in other
securities.”87 Only if the plaintiffs satisfied one of these prongs, he held,
would Rule 10b-5 be available.88 Applying the prongs to the facts of Mor-
rison, he concluded that the plaintiffs met neither, since they made their
purchases on an exchange located in Australia.89
In Justice Scalia’s view, the two-pronged transactional test offered the
advantages of restrictiveness, predictability, and fidelity to the text. These
advantages, however, are more apparent than real. Consider the actual
restrictiveness of the first prong—”transactions in securities listed on a
domestic exchange.” Read literally, this prong encompasses a transaction
occurring on a foreign exchange that involves a security listed on a do-
mestic exchange. So understood, this prong would allow Rule 10b-5 to
reach transactions happening anywhere in the world, as long as the secur-
ity is cross-listed in the United States. The lower courts have thus far
resisted this reading by deeming it to violate Morrison “read as a
whole,”90 a tacit acknowledgment that the transactional test is not truly
rooted in the text after all.
Consider next whether the second prong—domestic over the counter
transactions—truly offers predictability. When parties are located in dif-
ferent countries, how can one know whether their transaction occurs
here? Not surprisingly, the lower courts have had a difficult time drawing
workable lines.91
Consider finally, and most fundamentally, whether it is feasible to read
84. See id. at 255–61 (majority opinion).
85. Id. at 266.
86. Id. at 262, 266–67 (emphasis added).
87. Id. at 267.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 273.
90. See, e.g., City of Pontiac Policemen’s & Firemen’s Ret. Sys. v. UBS AG, 752 F.3d
173, 180 (2d Cir. 2014).
91. See, e.g., Parkcentral Glob. Hub Ltd. v. Porsche Auto. Holdings SE, 763 F.3d 198,
217–18 (2d Cir. 2014); Absolute Activist Value Master Fund Ltd. v. Ficeto, 677 F.3d 60,
67–69 (2d Cir. 2012). See also Christopher Calfee, Can’t See the Forest for the Trees: Where
Does a Purchase or Sale Occur?, 2 AM. U. BUS. L. REV. 154 (2012); Jacob True, Note, What
Counts as a Domestic Transaction Anymore: The Second Circuit and Other Lower Courts’
Struggles in Interpreting the Supreme Court’s Intent in Morrison v. Australia National Bank
When Dealing with Derivative Securities Transactions, 10 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 513 (2014).
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Section 10(b) embraces over the counter transactions in the first place.92
The unfeasibility of that reading emerges upon examining Section 10(b)
in the context of the Exchange Act as originally enacted.93 A perusal of
that Act reveals that domestic exchanges then served as venues for trans-
actions in unlisted securities as well as listed ones.94 That historical reality
provides a new perspective on Section 10(b), which was likely meant to
embrace all transactions on domestic exchanges, regardless of whether
the security being bought or sold was listed or unlisted. This interpreta-
tion tracks Section 10(b)’s reference to “purchase[s] or sale[s] of any se-
curit[ies] registered [listed] on [an] exchange or any security not so
registered [listed].”95
The alternative interpretation is more compelling than the one offered
by Justice Scalia precisely because it allows Section 10(b) to reach all
transactions occurring on domestic exchanges at the time of its enact-
ment. Justice Scalia acknowledged the emphasis given to exchanges by
the Exchange Act’s drafters.96 It seems inconceivable that those drafters
would have designed Section 10(b) to apply to only a fraction of the
transactions then occurring at those locations.
To be sure, even if Justice Scalia had identified the alternative interpre-
tation, he might have resisted it or been unable to persuade others to
adopt it. The reason is as follows: limiting Section 10(b) to domestic ex-
changes would have prevented the SEC and the DOJ from using it to
combat fraud on the domestic over-the-counter markets. Even assuming
that Congress would have intervened to restore that right to the govern-
ment, there would have been the risk of chaotic short-term consequences.
But those difficulties, however serious, do not justify the imposition of
the transactional test.
B. WHO “MAKES” A MISSTATEMENT—JANUS CAPITAL GROUP, INC.
V. FIRST DERIVATIVE TRADERS
In Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, the Court up-
held a restrictive test for ascertaining who qualifies as a “maker” of a
materially misleading misstatement or omission that violates Section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5(b).97 The Court apparently failed to appreciate that
its new test clashes with a provision in the PSLRA. The test appears to be
92. This question was not posed either by the majority opinion or by the opinions
concurring in the judgment. See supra notes 81–83 and accompanying text.
93. The legislative history of the Exchange Act is assembled in 4–11 LEGISLATIVE HIS-
TORY OF THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933 AND SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 (J.S.
Ellenberger & Ellen P. Mahar eds., 2001) [hereinafter LEGISLATIVE HISTORY].
94. Section 12(f) provided as follows: “The Commission is directed to make a study of
trading in unlisted securities upon exchanges and to report the results of its study and its
recommendations to Congress on or before January 3, 1936.” See LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,
supra note 93, at 894 (emphasis added).
95. For the text of Section 10(b), see supra note 6.
96. See Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 267 (2010).
97. 564 U.S. 135, 142–46 (2011).
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limited to private actions, but that limitation is not free from doubt.98
The underlying lawsuit involved three separate, albeit connected, enti-
ties—Janus Capital Group (JCG), a publicly held financial services com-
pany; Janus Investment Fund (JIF), a family of mutual funds created by
JCG; and Janus Capital Management (JCM), a subsidiary of JCG that
served as JIF’s investment adviser. The lawsuit was filed by JCG’s share-
holders, who alleged that statements appearing in JIF’s prospectuses,
drafted by JCM, had inflated the stock price of JCG. Named as defend-
ants were JCM and JCG, sued as JCM’s controlling person. The prospec-
tuses did not identify JCM as the drafter, but the shareholders contended
that the market would have known that JCM played that role. Not named
as a defendant was JIF, presumably because it lacked scienter.
A sharply divided Court concluded that JCM was not liable. With no
defendant primarily liable, the prospect of holding JCG liable as a con-
trolling person evaporated.
Justice Clarence Thomas wrote on behalf of the majority. He focused
his attention on the word “make” in Rule 10b-5(b), which deems it illegal
for anyone “[t]o make any untrue statement of a material fact.”99 In his
view, there were two reasons to give “make” a narrow reading. First, the
private action was implied rather than express.100 Moreover, if uncircum-
scribed, primary liability might embrace mere aiding and abetting, and
thereby nullify Central Bank.101 Taking into account these considerations
and culling definitions of “make” selectively from two 1933 dictionaries,
he announced the following test:
For purposes of Rule 10b–5, the maker of a statement is the person
or entity with ultimate authority over the statement, including its
content and whether and how to communicate it . . . . One who
prepares or publishes a statement on behalf of another is not its
maker. And in the ordinary case, attribution within a statement or
implicit from surrounding circumstances is strong evidence that a
statement was made by—and only by—the party to whom it is
attributed.102
Applying this test, he concluded that JIF was the entity with “ultimate
authority” over the contents of the prospectus and thereby the sole
maker of its alleged misstatements.103 That the latter were largely, if not
entirely, the creation of JCM carried no significance.
The ultimate authority test conflicts with Central Bank’s observation
concerning the applicability of primary liability to “secondary actors.” As
Central Bank explained:
98. See NAGY, PAINTER & SACHS, supra note 28, at 217–18.
99. Janus, 564 U.S. at 141 (emphasis added).
100. Id. at 144.
101. Id. at 143 n.6.
102. Id. at 142–43 (emphasis added).
103. Id. at 147–48.
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Any person or entity, including a lawyer, accountant, or bank, who
employs a manipulative device or makes a material misstatement (or
omission) on which a purchaser or seller of securities relies may be
liable as a primary violator under 10b–5, assuming all of the require-
ments for primary liability under Rule 10b–5 are met. In any com-
plex securities fraud, moreover, there are likely to be multiple
violators.104
To be sure, the Court is entitled to override its own precedents. But by
doing so in this instance, it ran roughshod over the PSLRA’s proportion-
ate liability provision.105 Enacted the year after Central Bank and aligned
with Central Bank in assuming the typicality of multiple primary viola-
tors, that provision deems each defendant liable only for the percentage
of the damage that the jury found her to have caused:
In any private action, the court shall instruct the jury to answer spe-
cial interrogatories, or if there is no jury, shall make findings, with
respect to each covered person and each of the other persons
claimed by any of the parties to have caused or contributed to the
loss incurred by the plaintiff, including persons who have entered
into settlements with the plaintiff or plaintiffs, concerning—
(i) whether such person violated the securities laws;
(ii) the percentage of responsibility of such person, measured as a
percentage of the total fault of all persons who caused or contrib-
uted to the loss incurred by the plaintiff; and
(iii) whether such person knowingly committed a violation of the
securities laws.106
This provision received no mention in Justice Breyer’s dissenting opin-
ion.107 Thus, it is entirely possible that the Court remained unaware of it.
C. THE REJECTION OF AMERICAN PIPE TOLLING—CALIFORNIA
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES’ RETIREMENT SYSTEM V. ANZ
SECURITIES, INC.
In California Public Employees’ Retirement System v. ANZ Securities,
Inc., the Supreme Court denied securities class action plaintiffs access to
the American Pipe tolling doctrine that is available to their antitrust class
action counterparts.108 To reach this result, the Court distinguished the
securities and antitrust limitation provisions in a manner that cannot sur-
vive scrutiny.
104. Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164,
191 (1994) (citation omitted).
105. See generally Donald C. Langevoort, The Reform of Joint and Several Liability
Under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995: Proportionate Liability, Contri-
bution Rights and Settlement Effects, 51 BUS. LAW. 1157 (1996); Marc I. Steinberg & Chris-
topher D. Olive, Contribution and Proportionate Liability Under the Federal Securities
Laws in Multidefendant Securities Litigation After the Private Securities Litigation Reform
Act of 1995, 50 SMU L. REV. 337 (1996).
106. Exchange Act § 21D(f), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(f)(3)(A) (2012).
107. See Janus, 564 U.S. at 148–61 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
108. 137 S. Ct. 2042, 2055 (2017).
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The ANZ plaintiff was a pension plan that had been a member of a
timely class action filed under Section 11 of the Securities Act.109 The
plaintiff opted out of that action and initiated an individual action based
on the same allegations following the expiration of Section 11’s three-
year limitation period. To establish the timeliness of its action, the plain-
tiff relied on American Pipe Construction Company v. Utah, which tolls
the limitation period for the benefit of the putative class members until
the issue of class certification is resolved.110 Without such tolling, the ex-
piration of the limitation period would prevent the class members from
pursuing individual actions unless they had filed protective actions in ad-
vance. But as explained by American Pipe, requiring them to do so would
lead to the “multiplicity of activity” that class actions were “designed to
avoid.”111
Prior to ANZ, lower courts deciding whether to apply American Pipe
tolling in the securities context tended to rely on Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind,
Prupris & Petigrew v. Gilbertson.112 At issue in Lampf was whether Rule
10b-5’s governing three-year (now five-year) limitation period was ame-
nable to a different type of equitable tolling—tolling occasioned by the
plaintiffs’ delay in discovering the fraud.113 Refusing to allow that exten-
sion in ANZ, the Court explained that the Rule 10b-5 limitation period,
along with its Section 11 counterpart, was intended as a “cutoff” or “pe-
riod of repose.”114 This “firm cut-off” characterization led the lower
courts to disallow tolling of the sort permitted by American Pipe as
well.115
In ANZ, a sharply divided Supreme Court held that American Pipe
does not apply to Section 11 class actions,116 or, by implication, to Rule
10b-5 class actions either.117 Writing for the majority was Justice Anthony
Kennedy, who announced a framework for determining the relevance of
American Pipe to any limitation provision, regardless of subject area. The
framework proceeds from the definitions of the terms “statute of limita-
tion” and “statute of repose” set forth in CTS Corporation v. Wald-
burger.118 According to CTS, those terms had long been used
interchangeably, but eventually developed different characteristics of
which Congress became cognizant in 1982.119 One such characteristic in-
109. Securities Act § 11, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (2012).
110. 414 U.S. 538, 552–53 (1974).
111. Id. at 551.
112. 501 U.S. 350 (1991). For an example of a court drawing on Lampf to determine
whether American Pipe applies in the securities context, see Police & Fire Ret. Sys. of City
of Detroit v. IndyMac MBS, Inc., 721 F.3d 95, 107, 109 (2d Cir. 2013).
113. See Lampf, 501 U.S. at 363.
114. Id.
115. See, e.g., IndyMac, 721 F.3d at 109.
116. Cal. Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. ANZ Secs., Inc., 137 S. Ct. 2042, 2052 (2017).
117. See, e.g., W. Va. Pipe Trades Health & Welfare Fund v. Medronic, Inc., 299 F.
Supp. 1055, 1063 (D. Minn. 2018) (citing ANZ, 137 S. Ct. at 2049, 2051).
118. ANZ, 137 S. Ct. at 2049 (citing CTS Corp. v. Waldburger, 134 S. Ct. 2175, 2182
(2014)).
119. See CTS, 134 S. Ct. at 2186.
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volves when the clock starts ticking: the date of the harm or its discovery
(statutes of limitation) versus the date of the defendant’s last act (statutes
of repose). The other involves purpose. Unlike statutes of limitation, stat-
utes of repose are designed to provide defendants with an inviolable
shield. Thus, an expired statute of repose is not subject to equitable toll-
ing, but an expired statute of limitation may be.120
Justice Kennedy applied the foregoing considerations to the limitation
provisions applicable to Section 11 and the antitrust violation at issue in
American Pipe. The limitation provision applicable to the former, set
forth in Section 13 of the Securities Act, reads in pertinent part: “In no
event shall any . . . action be brought to enforce a liability created under
[Section 11] . . . more than three years after the security was bona fide
offered to the public . . . .”121 According to Justice Kennedy, Section 13
clearly qualifies as a statute of repose, as the time runs from the defen-
dant’s last act.122 In addition, Section 13’s “in no event” declaration “ad-
mitt[ed] of no exception and on its face create[d] a fixed bar against
future liability.”123 In contrast, he found the limitation provision applica-
ble to the antitrust violation to be a statute of limitation on the ground
that the clock starts ticking from the time that the action accrues.124
Justice Kennedy failed to make a compelling case for classifying the
antitrust provision as a statute of limitation. That provision—the text of
which does not appear in the opinion—includes language signifying as
firm a cut-off as the “in no event” language in Section 13: “Any action to
enforce any cause of action under the antitrust laws shall be forever
barred unless commenced within four years after the cause of action ac-
crued.”125 While it is true that time begins running from the accrual date,
that fact carries less significance than might first appear. Indeed, Con-
gress enacted the limitation provision applicable to the antitrust violation
in 1955—more than a quarter century before 1982, the magic year desig-
nated by CTS for when Congress could be assumed to have become
aware of the statute of limitation/statute of repose distinction. In ANZ,
however, Justice Kennedy did not acknowledge the significance of the
1982 date, much less explain how to reconcile it with the antitrust provi-
sion’s pre-1982 enactment.
To be sure, Congress enacted Section 13 still earlier—in 1933. But that
date only further underscores the mismatch between the Court’s analysis
and its framework built on CTS.
Was Justice Kennedy aware of these problems? The “forever barred”
language in the antitrust provision—and its comparability to the “in no
120. See id. at 2182–83.
121. 15 U.S.C. § 77m (2012).
122. ANZ, 137 S. Ct. at 2049.
123. Id. (first alteration in original).
124. Id. at 2052–53.
125. 15 U.S.C. § 15b (2012) (emphasis added).
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event” phraseology in Section 13—arose at the oral argument.126 While
the significance of the 1982 date went unmentioned, it is surely relevant
that the author of the Court’s opinion in CTS was Justice Kennedy him-
self.127 Did he fail to recall this aspect of his own opinion? Did none of
his colleagues recall it either? These questions hover over his opinion in
ANZ.
V. THE CHAIN OF EVENTS IN PERSPECTIVE
As Part IV shows, the Supreme Court’s recent decisions restricting
Rule 10b-5 are not models of craftsmanship. It is profoundly ironic that
lack of craftsmanship would characterize decisions in a sequence precipi-
tated by Judge Friendly, who was widely revered as a master
craftsman.128
Why have securities law academics largely ignored the lack of crafts-
manship underlying the Court’s recent Rule 10b-5 restrictions? I suspect
that the answer is straightforward. As a group we tend to be fairly antag-
onistic towards private Rule 10b-5 litigation, with the result that we are
not inclined to criticize efforts to restrict it. On the other hand, we would
become indignant if confronted with misinterpretations that brought
about Rule 10b-5’s expansion. There would not be enough forests to sup-
ply the paper needed for the volumes that we would write.
Our selective indignation is troublesome for several reasons. One is
that it makes us appear hypocritical. We would object loudly if lawyers or
boards of directors tailored performance of their respective monitoring
obligations to suit their respective policy agendas.
Another is that some restrictions that may appear to govern only pri-
vate litigation may eventually be found to extend to government enforce-
ment as well. Consider the ultimate authority test upheld by Janus
Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders.129 On the one hand, the
Court attributed the test’s restrictiveness to the fact that the private ac-
tion is implied,130 thereby suggesting that the test applies to private litiga-
tion only. On the other hand, the Court prefaced the test with the words
“[f]or purposes of Rule 10b-5,”131 thus raising the prospect that the test
extends more broadly.
Consider also the transnational test upheld by Morrison v. National
Australia Bank Ltd.132 While the Dodd-Frank Act may seem to have
overridden that decision on behalf of the SEC and the DOJ, reality is
more complicated. According to Professor Richard W. Painter and vari-
126. See Transcript of Oral Argument at *12, *20, *31, Cal. Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v.
ANZ Secs., Inc., 137 S. Ct. 2042 (2017) (No. 16-373), 2017 WL 1375796.
127. CTS Corp. v. Waldburger, 134 S. Ct. 2175, 2180 (2014).
128. See, e.g., Michael Boudin, Judge Henry Friendly and the Craft of Judging, 159 U.
PA. L. REV. 1, 1–2 (2010).
129. 564 U.S. 135 (2011).
130. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
131. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
132. 561 U.S. 247 (2010).
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ous prominent defense attorneys, Dodd-Frank did not succeed in ex-
panding the government’s enforcement authority over transnational
securities fraud.133 Professor Painter’s view has caused some federal dis-
trict judges to wonder whether Dodd-Frank overcame Morrison, which
they have continued to apply.134
Morrison, Janus, and ANZ offer guidance to those of us inclined to
critique the Court’s future Rule 10b-5 restrictions. First, we should be
skeptical about solutions alleged to be rooted in statutory text. Consider
that it was Justice Scalia, founder of the textualist approach to statutory
interpretation and a master practitioner thereof,135 who became suffi-
ciently captivated by the transactional test that he failed to probe its tex-
tual soundness. If he, of all people, can stumble in this fashion, literally
anyone can.
Second, we should watch for red flags that the Court, intentionally or
not, sends our way. The ANZ Court provided such a flag by omitting the
text of the antitrust limitation provision that played a critical role in its
reasoning. That text calls into question the soundness of the holding,
which was dubious for other reasons as well.
Finally, we should all keep our eyes on Justice Sonia Sotomayor, who
did not participate in the Morrison decision and joined dissenting opin-
ions in Janus and in ANZ. She served for eleven years as a member of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, the “Mother
Court” of securities law,136 renowned not only for the sheer volume of its
securities cases but also for their doctrinal richness.137 In that capacity,
she heard more appeals of securities cases—at least as measured by re-
ported decisions—than did any of her Supreme Court colleagues with
prior service as circuit court judges, as the following table shows.
Years as Circuit Judge
Justice Hearing Securities Cases Service on Panels
Sotomayor 11 27
Alito 16 17
Breyer 14 21
Ginsburg 13 2
Kennedy 13 17
Roberts 2 1
Gorsuch 11 8
133. See, e.g., Richard W. Painter et al., When Courts and Congress Don’t Say What
They Mean: Initial Reactions to Morrison v. National Australia Bank and to the Extraterri-
torial Provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act, 20 MINN. J. INT’L L. 1, 4 (2011).
134. See, e.g., SEC v. Chi. Convention Ctr., LLC, 961 F. Supp. 2d 905, 916–17 (N.D. Ill.
2013).
135. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Siegel, The Legacy of Justice Scalia and His Textualist Ideal,
85 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 857, 858–59 (2017).
136. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 677, 762 (1975) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
137. See NAGY, PAINTER & SACHS, supra note 28, at 15.
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Will Justice Sotomayor come to the aid of her fellow justices on the secur-
ities law front? Notwithstanding her impressive background, she may
choose instead to pursue other priorities.
VI. CONCLUSION
Judge Friendly’s Texas Gulf Sulphur concurrence reverberates today in
a manner that could not have been anticipated. He urged curtailment of
private Rule 10b-5 litigation to blunt its perils, a warning heeded by the
Supreme Court, and thereafter by Congress as well. But now the Court,
buoyed by the reinforcement, has become less careful when restricting
Rule 10b-5. The Court—as well as securities law academics—need to
temper their policy inclinations with fidelity to Judge Friendly’s standards
of legal craftsmanship.
